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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: ALL
BARK, NO BITE?
Exercising the right to vote is an essential component of our
democracy and is protected by the Fourteenth1 and Fifteenth
Amendments 2 of the United States Constitution. Congress,
therefore, has ample power pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause 3 to preserve such voting rights in congressional
elections. 4 The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that "[n]o states shall...deny to any per-
sons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). See generally Nixon v. Con-
don, 286 U.S. 73, 84 (1932) (striking down statute allowing political parties to determine
who could be members and vote); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding
that statute preventing blacks from voting in primaries was blatant violation of Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (providing that "[t]he right... to vote shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude"); see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915)
(striking down attempt by Oklahoma to avoid Fifteenth Amendment through use of
grandfather clause enabling only those capable of voting in 1866 and their descendants to
vote); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (establishing voting as fundamental
political right).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5,
amend XV, § 2 (granting Congress enforcement power by appropriate legislation); see
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (interpreting use Necessary and
Proper Clause to be appropriate and convenient where federal government sought to es-
tablish national bank). See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The Proper
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE
L.J. 267, 336 n.189 (1993) (stating that rationale behind enabling clauses is that they
confer upon federal government similar enforcement power that state governments pos-
sess); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155 (1992) (stating that while states could act using their general
police powers, Congress would have had difficulty finding similar enforcement power
without section 2).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 1 (providing general rules governing election of
United States Representatives); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §4 (allowing states to pre-
scribe time, place and manner for election of Senators and Representatives); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (holding that constitutional power of Congress to regulate
procedure for federal elections is well established and beyond reproach); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 120 (1970) (noting that Necessary and Proper Clause further
augments Congress' power to regulate national elections); see, e.g., United States v.
Classic et al., 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) (noting that state law makes primaries integral
part of overall election process, therefore subject to protection under art. I, § 2 of Consti-
tution). But see Republican Part of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp.
1228, 1235 (D. Conn. 1984), affd, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (holding that state's power to
regulate conduct in primaries is given great weight); Mitchell v. United States, 400 U.S.
112, 122 (1970) (determining that Congress has power to regulate congressional elections
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manifestation of Congress' reaction to the abhorrent racial dis-
crimination in voting rights in the United States. 5 Put simply,
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("the Act") to bar
discriminatory voting laws in any form on the basis of race or
color. 6
Congress' objective in drafting the Act was to eliminate the use
of voter dilution devices such as literacy tests, poll taxes and in-
timidation tactics. 7 The Act was also designed to prevent the in-
troduction of new devices or processes that might dilute the vot-
ing rights of Black citizens. 8 Despite the laudable goals of the
including age and other qualifications).
5 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 4-7
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-84 (indicating purpose of act to prohibit
any voting practice or procedure resulting in discrimination); H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 23
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2440 (noting original purpose of Voting
Rights Act was to protect African Americans); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
392 (1991) (indicating lack of controversy in passing Voting Rights Act was due to its be-
ing viewed as restating Fifteenth Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 308 (1966) (noting purpose is to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in vot-
ing."); Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that Voting
Rights Act prohibited "any practice that abridged right of any citizen to vote"); McGhee v.
Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that 1982 amendments to
Voting Rights Act were not intended to be interpreted as providing right of proportional
representation). See generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT: AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 4 (1987) (suggesting sole purpose of
Voting Rights Act was black enfranchisement); David 0. Barrett, Note, The Remedial
Use of Race-Based Redistricting After Shaw v. Reno, 70 IND. L.J. 255, 258-59 (1994)
(noting that remedial purpose of VRA was originally interpreted to allow creation of ma-
jority-minority districts).
6 See Board of Estimate City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692 (1989) (noting
that equal protection guarantee of "one person, one vote" extends to congressional dis-
tricting plans); see also Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Missouri et
al., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970) (interpreting one person-one vote rule to require that "each
person's vote counts as much, insofar as it is practicable, as any other person's"); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (noting that Equal Protection Clause requires ad-
herence to principle of one person, one vote); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963)
(suggesting that Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments require each per-
son's vote be given equal weight).
7 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 189-90
(noting that "a broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the
new black vote"); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)
(holding that switch from district to at-large voting may result in dilution of minority
voting power); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (finding dilution of voting strength can be as
harmful as outright prohibition of voting rights). See generally Captain Frederick G.
Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 62 U. CIN.
L. REV. 823, 846 (1994) (noting Supreme Court needed to adopt concept of vote dilution
not for constitutional reasons but to give effect to Voting Rights Act); Mary J. Kosterlitz,
Note, Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court's New Test for Analyzing Minority Vote
Dilution, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 531, 535 (1987) (explaining that vote dilution is premised
on illegal attempts to infringe on minority power to elect representatives of their choice).
8 See THERNSTROM, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that Mississippi legislative amended
state laws to reduce minority gains derived from increased black voter registration);
Nancy K. Bannon, The Voting Rights Act: Over The Hill At Age 30?, 22 HuM. RTS. 10, 11
(1995) (noting that Voting Rights Act is viewed as primary force behind dramatic in-
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Act, minorities continued to be underrepresented in the United
States Congress. 9
Following the 1990 census, many new congressional districts
were created with the intention of increasing the number of mi-
nority members in Congress. 10 To effectuate this purpose and
comply with the mandates of the Act, these newly-drawn dis-
tricts were designed to be majority-minority districts. 11 These
majority-minority districts were intended to permit sufficiently
large groups of minority voters to elect a candidate of their
choice within their district. 12 Many of these districts, however,
are threatened by constitutional challenges based on the notion
that race conscious redistricting violates the Fourteenth
crease in minority election to public office); Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution
In Minority Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 271, 272 (1995) (stating that extraordinary in-
crease in minority office holding largely result of increase in majority-minority districts);
see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1738-1739 (1993) (stating that black elected officials became part of politi-
cal system because of pressures exerted by Congress on executive branch through its
preclearance requirements).
9 See Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Com-
mitment to Color Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 770-71 (1996)
(noting severe underrepresentation of minorities in Congress and that "blacks who con-
stitute 11.1% of nation's voting age population, made up only 4.9% of the members of
Congress. Hispanics, with 7.3% of the country's voting age population, had only 2.5% of
the representation in Congress"). See generally HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G.
NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 9 (1992) (providing statistical breakdown
of minority representation).
10 See Sean Simpson, Note, Could the Best Tightrope Walkers Manage to Walk the
Line Between Race Consciousness and Race-Predominance? An Analysis of Race-Based
Redistricting in Light of Miller v. Johnson, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1317, 1352 (1996)
(remarking that country saw largest increase in minority representation since passage of
Voting Rights Act); see also Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistrict-
ing: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (noting increase from 26 to 52
black members of Congress and 13 to 18 in House Hispanic Caucus after 1990 census).
11 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (acknowledging that if states were
divided into strictly multimember districts significant minorities could be completely
shut out from pro rata because of "winner take all" system); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 430
U.S. 124, 142 (1971) (noting constitutionality of submerging minorities in winner take all
election, but holding unconstitutional purposeful devising districts to create multimem-
ber districts); McDonald, supra note 8, at 289 (stating that effect of majority-minority
districts has been creation of most integrated districts in country); Jack Quinn et. al.,
Congressional Redistricting in the 1990's: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act, 1 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 207, 209 (1990) (stating that legislative
redistricters must draw minority districts whenever failure to do so would result in mi-
nority vote dilution); see also A. Leon Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of
Good Intentions With Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1624-
25 (1994) (stating that insinuations that majority-minority districts are comparable to
political apartheid are absurd because of apartheid's damaging effects to minorities).
12 See McDonald, supra note 8, at 271 (concluding that increase in minority office
holdings is directly linked to increase in majority-minority districts); see also Carol Rho-
des, Changing the Constitutional Guarantee of Voting Rights from Color Conscious to
Color-Blind: Judicial Activism by the Rehnquist Court, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 309, 316
(1996) (noting creation of majority-minority districts is to remedy past discrimination).
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Amendment and is not mandated by the Act. 13 The Supreme
Court, therefore, has been faced with the paradox of interpreting
a statute intended to remedy racial injustice while simultane-
ously limiting the use of race as a factor in implementing the
remedy.
This Note analyzes the future of the Voting Rights Act within
the constitutional framework promulgated by the Supreme Court
in its recent pronouncements in redistricting decisions. Part
One reviews the development of sections 2 and 5 of the Act and
the case law interpreting them. Part Two reviews the Court's
"new" equal protection standing in the context of voting rights
violations. Part Three assesses the effect of the present Court's
departure from a jurisprudence which permitted race-based
classifications in congressional redistricting. Part Four explores
the difficulties that states face regarding compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, while simultaneously avoiding the present
Court's conservative Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that while a state may theoretically
attempt to address minority representation concerns, the present
Court's strict scrutiny standard of review will continue to
threaten new gains in minority representation achieved through
redistricting.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
A. Section Two: Using a Result Based Analysis
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to safeguard the
voting rights of citizens regardless of their race. 14 Sections 2 and
13 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1950 (1996) (challenging Texas legislature's re-
districting plan on the grounds that it violated 14th Amendment); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 903 (1995) (challenging redistricting plan on grounds that it violated Equal
Protection Clause); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993) (challenging Districts One
and Twelve on grounds that they violated Fourteenth Amendment); Able v. Wilkins, 946
F. Supp. 174, 174 (D.S.C. 1996) (challenging three state senate election districts and nine
house election districts on grounds that they were drawn with race as predominant fac-
tor).
14 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1990) (recognizing broad remedial pur-
pose of Voting Rights Act which should be interpreted to permit "broadest possible scope
in combating racial discrimination"); Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567
(1969) (finding that Voting Rights Act should be read to provide broadest possible scope
for fighting voting discrimination based on race); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 315 (1966) (noting Voting Rights Act enacted for broad remedial purpose of eliminat-
ing racial discrimination in voting); see also Mark W. Mahoney, Comment, The Voting
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5 are the most effective in combating minority vote dilution.15
These sections are the backbone of the Act and are widely used
to remedy violations of minority voting rights.
Section 2 of the Act, states in part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color...
Section 2 is essentially a codification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. 16 Its promulgation serves as the mechanism for bringing
voting rights discrimination claims in federal court. 17
Many courts interpreted section 2 as requiring a "purposeful
intent" to discriminate in order to establish a violation, while
other courts only required a "discriminatory result."18 In 1980,
the Supreme Court, in Mobile v. Bolden,19 resolved this uncer-
tainty by invoking an intent test. This test required proof that
the challenged districting plan resulted in minority vote dilution,
and that the plan was enacted with the actual intent to deprive
minority plaintiffs of voting power. 20 The stringent standard set
Rights Act of 1965: Is It Applicable to State Judicial Elections?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 745, 749
(1991) (noting care taken by Congress in wording statute to provide maximum scope
possible). See generally HOWARD & DALE KRANE & THOMAS P. LAUTH, COMPROMISED
COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 14-18 (1982) (providing
general framework of Voting Rights Act and its pertinent sections).
15 See Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section Five of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L.& SOC. PROBS. 337, 339 (1996) (suggesting
that VRA is most effective civil rights legislation ever passed in United States); Carol R.
Goforth, What is She? How Race Matters and Why it Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 53
(1996) (noting success of Voting Rights Act in combating overt discrimination on basis of
race); see also Glenn P. Smith, Interest Exception to One-Resident, One Vote: Better Re-
sults From the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1181 (1996) (recognizing success
of section two challenges to judicial election practices).
16 See Adam J. Chill, The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments With Respect to the
Voting Franchise: A Constitutional Quandary, 25 COLUM. J.L.& SOC. PROBS. 645, 653
(1992) (suggesting substance of Fifteenth Amendment was codified in Voting Rights Act
of 1965); Michael J. Moffat, The Death of the Voting Rights Act or an Exercise in Geome-
try? Shaw v. Reno Provides More Questions Than Answers, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 727, 740
(1995) (noting Voting Rights Act is codification of Fifteenth Amendment).
17 See Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas". Lesbian and Gay Districts and
Black Electoral Empowerment, 39 How. L.J. 149, 153 (1995) (noting that section 2 con-
tains provision permitting racial and linguistic minorities to challenge districting plans
that dilute their voting power).
18 See Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 33 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that
"intent test" was repudiated by 1982 Amendments).
19 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
20 Id. at 55 (declaring that establishment of section 2 or Fifteenth Amendment viola-
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ALL BARK, NO BITE?
forth in Bolden proved to be difficult to meet and effectively
barred victims of voting rights violations from establishing their
claims. 21
Congress remedied the harsh effects of the intent test by
amending the Act in 1982,22 requiring a result standard to de-
termine violations of section 2.23 Through this change, Congress
sought to lessen the burden on plaintiffs seeking relief under
section 2.24
tion required proof of intentional discrimination). See Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirma-
tive Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 332 (1995-96)
(discussing Bolden standard which required plaintiffs to show at-large elections were
maintained for discriminatory purpose); see also Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights
Act and the "Conscientious Redistricter" 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995) (suggesting
"totality of circumstances" approach may be used to infer "intent" on part of legislatures).
21 See Tim R. Sass & Stephen L. Mehay, The Voting Rights Act, District Elections, 38
J.L. & ECON. 367, 368 (1995) (suggesting that movement to challenge at-large voting sys-
tems was temporarily derailed by Mobile decision); see also Michael E. Lewynn, How
Radical is Lani Guinier?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 927, 929 (1994) (stating "broad coalition of civil
rights activists" urged Congress to amend Voting Rights Act).
22 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 amended by Pub. L. No. 97-20, 96 Stat. 134
(1982).
23 See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, Texas, 725 F.2d 1017,1021 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting
that Congressional passage of 1982 Amendment included rejection of purpose test and
adoption of result test); Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up". Minority Political Par-
ticipation and Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 450-51 (1988)
(noting that Congress amended Voting Rights Act by providing second avenue of relief
which required only proof that voting device resulted in discrimination); Lewynn, supra
note 21, at 931 (noting 1982 amendments signaled Congress' disapproval of results test);
see also Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Parhman, Amended Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1987) (stating that
prior to 1982 amendments, it was unclear whether Congress intended to establish re-
quirement of discriminatory intent or merely discriminatory results); Frank R. Parker,
The "Results" Test of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Stan-
dard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1983) (noting elimination of intent in 1982 amendments
was highly controversial).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1972). Section 2 specifically provides as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 1973-b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section
(b) [a] violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State of political subdividion are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protection by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or politi-
cal subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: [p]rovided, that noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.; see City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (ruling that it was not
enough to prove intent by showing inadequate representation).
1997]
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Thereafter, the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles25 interpreted
the amended language of section 2 to require three preconditions
for establishing a claim. 26 First, the minority group must dem-
onstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in one or more single member districts.27
Second, the minority group should be politically cohesive. 28 Fi-
nally, the plaintiffs must prove that the majority has also voted
as a bloc and generally has defeated a minority's preferred can-
didate. 29 The requirements in Gingles eliminate the stringent
standard set forth in Bolden and permit claims to be brought
under section 2 where a state's redistricting plan results in dis-
crimination.30
B. Section Five of the Act
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 31 is commonly known as the
25 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
26 Id. at 30 (1986) (holding that North Carolina redistricting plans violated totality of
circumstances set forth in section 2).
27 Id. at 31 (requiring that minority group support singular candidate).
28 Id. (stating that bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates
supported by politically cohesive minority).
29 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 (showing analytical techniques to compile data con-
cerning voting patterns of minority groups); McKaskle, supra note 20, at 29-30 (stating
that geographical compactness requirement prevents against legislating for proportional
representation); Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Con-
taining Two or More Minority Groups - When Is the Whole Greater Than the Sum Of the
Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95, 128-129 (1989) (stating that courts should determine
that group is properly aggregated so as to ensure that purpose of Act is being carried
out).
30 See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1982, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 180 (addressing idea expressed in Bolden by noting that Voting Rights Act does not
require proof of discriminatory intent); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765
(1973) (noting that plaintiffs burden of proof rests on evidence showing its members had
less opportunity than others in given district to participate in political process and be
represented in Congress fairly); c.f. Jack Quinn et al., Congressional Redistricting in the
1990's: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 1 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 207, 244 (1990) (enumerating three part Gingles test to be used when mi-
nority group asserts that additional minority districts should have been created).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Section 5 provides in relevant part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to the prohibitions set forth in
section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sen-
tence of section 1973(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 ... such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) .. ."
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"preclearance section," because it remedies discriminatory voting
practices by mandating that all voting laws be reviewed by the
Justice Department before they may be implemented. Section 5
is applicable to states that have a documented history of imple-
menting voter dilution devices ("covered states").32 It precludes
covered states from enforcing voting changes until they are
submitted to the Justice Department and cleared by the Attor-
ney General. 33 A covered state, therefore, has the burden of
proving to the Justice Department, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a change does not have a discriminatory purpose
or effect.
34
The Supreme Court, in Beer v. United States,35 refined this
32 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (holding Congress in-
tended to reach any state enactment which altered election law of covered state in any
way); Beer v. U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1957) (holding redistricting plan which created mi-
nority district where none existed does not violate section 5 of Voting Rights Act); see also
James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doc-
trinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 559 (1995) (defining covered jurisdiction under sec-
tion 5's preclearance requirement as state presumed to have taken part in pattern of dis-
criminatory practices in past in order to prevent minorities from equal access to political
process); Katharine Inglis Butler, In the U.S. Supreme Court: May a Court Adopt a Tem-
porary "Remedial" Election Plan That Mirrors the Very Plan It Has Enjoined for Not Fol-
lowing Voting Rights Act Requirements?, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 7, 1996, at 26, 10588,
available in 1996 WL 564831 (1996) (emphasizing covered jurisdictions have burden of
proving that changes made to voting practices do not discriminate against minorities).
33 See Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness - Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section Five
of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 847, 848 (1992) (stating that preclearance
requires proof that proposed changes in certain jurisdictions will not have discriminatory
effects on account of race, color or membership in language minority); Laughlin McDon-
ald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1284-85
(1989) (suggesting that appointments made by President to Department of Justice sig-
nificantly impacts effectiveness of Preclearance provision); see also R. Tim Hay, Com-
ment, Blind Salamanders, Minority Representation, and the Edwards Aquifer: Reconcil-
ing Use-Based Management of Natural Resources with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 25
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1449, 1477 (1994) (stating that preclearance often freezes politics of state
because reviewing authority must ensure that jurisdiction is in full compliance with
Voting Rights Act). See generally BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 17-18 (1992) (stating that context of 1965 Act
which included section 5 required covered states to submit changes to voting rights prior
to their implementation).
34 See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (holding non-retrogression principle was ameliorative
because it improved blacks' representation); James A. Blumstein, Defining and Proving
Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting
Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 688 (1983) (explaining non-retrogression principle as
applied in Beer); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting. A Cri-
tique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 48 (1995) (noting non-retrogression principle
does not allow for free racial gerrymandering); see also Lockhart v. United States, 460
U.S. 125, 136 (1983) (applying principles established in Beer and concluding that intro-
duction of staggered terms would not have "retrogressive effect on minority voting
strength"); James B. Zouras, Shaw v. Reno: A Color Blind Court in a Race Conscious So-
ciety, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 934 (1995) (discussing plan which was struck down be-
cause section 5 precludes changes that have retrogression effect).
35 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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test by finding that a "discriminatory purpose or effect" exists
only if a covered state's voting change subject to preclearance
meets two conditions. 36 First, the change is subject to the
"retrogression test" which requires that the state enhance or
leave unchanged the current electoral position of minorities.
37
Second, the voting change must not result in discrimination
against minorities in violation of the Constitution.
38
Until recently, sections 2 and 5 served as a powerful tool in re-
ducing discrimination in the redistricting process. 39 The Su-
preme Court, however, in its most recent congressional redis-
tricting decisions, has invalidated many of the newly-drawn
congressional districts on constitutional grounds. 40 The Court's
current approach to reviewing race-based redistricting raises the
issue of whether minorities, once again, have been denied the
necessary tools to combat societal discrimination in voting
rights.
II. SHAW V. RENO: MANUFACTURING A CLAIM FOR VOTING RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
In Shaw v. Reno, 41 the Supreme Court wrestled with the issue
of whether North Carolina's redistricting plan, which included
36 Id. at 131. An ameliorative plan cannot violate section 5 unless the plan itself dis-
criminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution. Id.
37 Id. at 146.
38 Id.
39 See HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 57 (1982) (stating that Justice Department's efforts along with
civil rights groups and complying registrars led to doubling of southern black electorate
by 1968); see also Susan L. Hearne, League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Clements: Section Two of the Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1712, 1719-20 (1991) (stating that relationship between sections 2 and 5 aim to eliminate
all forms of racial discrimination in all voting practices); cf. Arthur J. Anderson, Texas
Legislative Redistricting: Proposed Constitutional and Statutory Amendments for Im-
proved Process, 43 SW. L.J. 719, 744 (1989) (noting basis for racial discrimination claims
lie within Fifteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and sections 2 and 5 of Voting
Rights Act).
40 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1959-60 (1996) (holding three Texas districts
are unconstitutional since race was "predominant factor" motivating drawing of district
lines); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (invalidating Georgia's majority black
eleventh district because State "subordinated to racial objectives" is traditional district-
ing principles); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding that appellants claims
under Equal Protection Clause and reapportionment scheme is so extremely irregular on
its face that it rationally can be viewed only as effort to segregate races for purpose of
voting).
41 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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majority-minority districts, was constitutional. 42 The Court, in
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggested that
the plaintiffs might be harmed by reinforcement of racial stereo-
types. It was proffered that this harm may result because clas-
sifications may reinforce the notion that an elected official only
represents a specific racial group. 43 The Court's willingness to
consider this potential stigma as injury-in-fact allowed the Shaw
plaintiffs to bring a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.44
This decision began the weakening of the mandates of the Voting
Rights Act.45 The Court's willingness to entertain such a claim
may result in a retreat in America's thirty-year commitment to
racial equality in the area of voting rights.46
To further complicate matters, the Court, without much clari-
fication, suggested in dicta that although benign race classifica-
42 See id. at 634 (1996) (stating question before Court is whether appellants claim,
revising district plan to create irregular-shaped district and therefore racial gerryman-
dering, was cognizable); see also Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of
Things to Come, 26 RUTGERs L.J. 723, 724 (1995) (noting possible effect of Shaw is to
threaten electoral gains made in 1992). See generally Richard C. Reuben, Voting Rights
in Court-Challenges to Race-Based Districts Could Shatter Minority Electoral Gains, 13
CAL. LAW. 39, 40 (1993) (arguing challenges to race-based districts are potential threat to
minority electoral gains); Stephens A. Holmes, Did Racial Redistricting Undermine
Democrats?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 1, 32 (arguing race-based reapportionment
siphoned Democratic votes out of white districts and cost democrats five seats in 1992
and 10 seats in 1994).
43 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653 (suggesting that strict scrutiny is necessary to deter-
mine if classification is truly benign); see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (recognizing preferential race assignment may result in harm to its intended
beneficiaries); United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that preferential race assignment may dis-
guise policy that results in continuation of disadvantageous treatment of plan's benefici-
aries); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that stigmatization and racial
hostility may result from racial classification).
44 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50 (suggesting that classification of voters only by race in-
jures voters by reinforcing racial stereotypes which undermine system of representative
democracy); cf. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1983) (stating that unless
classifications based on race are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may pro-
mote notions of racial inferiority). See generally Goforth, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that
race is considered factor in Congressional redistricting, adoption, employment, and edu-
cation).
45 See McDonald, supra note 8, at 273-74 (noting Court's opinion threatens to over-
throw gains in minority office holding); O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 723 (noting possible
effect of Shaw is to threaten electoral gains).
46 See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995)
(holding minority set-aside programs adopted by Congress to foster racial diversity must
pass strict scrutiny review); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (ruling strict
scrutiny standard of review to be applied to any minority-majority electoral district in
which race was predominant factor in promulgation of such district); Thornburg v. Gin-
gles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (requiring federal judges fashioning redistricting remedies to
rely solely on single-member districts); Parker, supra note 9, at 764 (noting Court's re-
cent decisions adversely effect efforts to gain greater equity in electoral representation).
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tions are permissible, strict scrutiny review must be applied to
determine if the classification is truly harmless.
47 The most
troublesome aspect of the Court's holding, however, is its failure
to insist upon a showing of discriminatory intent or purpose by
the North Carolina legislature. 48 By failing to require an injury-
in-fact, the Court has opened a floodgate of challenges to many of
the newly-drawn districts that were designed to combat long
standing racial inequities.
49
A. Representational Harms in a Race-Conscious Society
Shaw and its progeny recognized that any group of voters may
state a cognizable claim in challenging newly-drawn districts so
long as they were drawn with respect to race.
50 The harm that
was recognized by the Court is most accurately described as the
withholding of the right to participate in a color-blind election.
5 1
47 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653 (considering level of scrutiny which should apply in ap-
portionment context); Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Rorschach Test for Racial Gerrymanders,
LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 25 (noting that Shaw reiterates important constitutional
principle that racial classifications should be used for important reasons and in small
doses). But cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Delve Anew Into Race and Voting Rights, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., July 12, 1993, at 20 (reasoning failure of small minority group to achieve
success at polls cannot indicate Voting Rights Act is at odds with theory of Voting Rights
Act). See generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS, 63-78 (1987).
48 See James B. Zouras, Shaw v. Reno: A Color-Blind Court In A Race Conscious So-
ciety, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 969 (1995) (criticizing Court's failure to require showing of
discriminatory intent undermines purpose of Fourteenth Amendment); see also United
Jewish Org. Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-68 (1977) (noting Court's proposition in Beer
that Constitution does not prevent state from "creatling] or preserv[ing] black majorities
in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with
section 5."); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has
been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups"); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (requiring more than mere lack of success at polls
to make out successful claim).
49 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (discussing whether stigmatic harm
to racially defined group gives individual member of that group standing); see also An-
tonin Scalia, The Doctrine Of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1983) (emphasizing that courts should accord
greater weight to traditional requirement that plaintiffs alleged injury be particularized
one, which sets plaintiff apart from others); Brian R. Markley, Comment, Constitutional
Provisions in Conflict: Article III Standing and Equal Protection After Shaw v. Reno, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 449, 466 (1995) (noting that injury suffered in Shaw resembles abstract,
generalized harm previously deemed insufficient to satisfy art. III case or controversy 
for
standing).
50 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658 (holding valid cause of action existed under Equal Pro-
tection Clause because irrational apportionment separated voters based on race); see also
Miller, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995) (holding residents of challenged district had standing to
bring equal protection challenge).
51 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642 (noting appellants did not allege harm due to vote dilu-
tion based on race rather they claimed segregating voters based on race violated consti-
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As a result, although covered states may be compelled to legis-
late in accordance with the Justice Department, they will be pre-
emptively deemed to have a discriminatory intent. 52 It is submit-
ted that the merits of such a case are more likely to be reached
under an equal protection claim rather than under a claim of
vote dilution. 53 The Court's imaginative standing criteria estab-
lished by Shaw seems to indicate their disdain for the use of race
in any districting context. 54 The immediate impact of Shaw's
holding was the threat to majority-minority districts created in
response to the 1990 census. 55
III. MILLER V. JOHNSON: SIGNALING THE END OF INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY FOR BENIGN RACE DISCRIMINATION
In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court strayed further into
the political thicket. 56 The Miller Court expanded the Shaw
holding by permitting both a claim of representational harm and
tutional right to have "color-blind" electoral process); cf. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S.
737, 750 (1995) (finding appellants did not have standing for their complaint that redis-
tricting scheme violated voter's right to engage in color-blind process); Kimberly V.
Mann, Note, Shaw v. Reno: A Grim Foreboding for Minority Voting Rights, 5 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 147, 164 (1994) (noting nothing in Constitution guarantees right
to color-blind election).
52 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (discussing necessity of judicial inquiry into purpose
behind statutes that have express racial classification); Zouras, supra note 34, at 971-972(suggesting Court's automatic presumption of invidious intent is troublesome); see also
Robert A. Curtis, Race-Based Equal Protection Claims After Shaw v. Reno, 44 DUKE L.J.
298, 306-07 (1994) (examining Shaw's irregular shape interpretation conflict with other
areas of law); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique
of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1995) (discussing inconsistencies between Shaw
and prior cases stemming from Shaw's presumption of invalidity regarding racial classi-
fication).
53 See Zouras, supra note 34, at 971 (noting plaintiffs in context of vote dilution claim
would have faced impossible challenge in proving discriminatory effect).
54 See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 292-93 (1996) (discussing Shaw, Court references to
"segregation" in regards to standing which "obscures the point that the challenged dis-
tricts are in fact among the most racially diverse in the country"); see, e.g., Jack Prit-
chard, Note, United States v. Hays: A Winnowing of Standing to Sue in Racial Gerry-
mandering Claims, 47 MERCER L. REV. 955, 961 (1996) (discussing Hays as reaction to
Shaw regarding existence of standing based on stigmatic injury).
55 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1993) (stating that majority-
minority districts threatened by Shaw decision were drawn as result of 1990 census).
56 See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2500 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating that federal courts ventured into political thicket of apportionment to secure
equal voting rights for members of racial minorities). But see Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (reiterating that state legislatures, not federal courts, are responsible
for reapportionment); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-96 (1973) (recognizing that dis-
tricting is part of political process, such decisions must be made by those charged with
political tasks).
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holding that the shape of a district created a presumption of
race-based redistricting. 57 The Court stopped short, however, of
completely eliminating the use of race as a consideration in re-
districting.58 The plurality opinion failed to provide any clear
guidelines in determining to what extent race may be used in
congressional redistricting. 59 In a potentially fatal blow to the
Voting Rights Act, Justice O'Connor rationalized the application
of strict scrutiny to Georgia's Eleventh District by holding that
compliance with section 5 of the Act did not constitute a compel-
ling interest.60 Thus, the Court found it was irrelevant that the
redistricting plan was "narrowly tailored" to such interests. 61
The Court determined that a proper reading of the Voting Rights
57 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 (requiring showing that race was primary motivation
in shaping district while traditional districting principles were subordinated); see also id.
at 2498, 2500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Georgia's congressional plan was
form of "racial integration" designed to ensure Black participation in electoral process);
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 87 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out
that legislators make judgments that members of certain identifiable groups whether
racial, ethnic, economic will vote in same manner); Richard H. Pildes, Book Review, The
Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (1995)
(pointing out that contention like "blacks need not run in 'safe' minority districts to be
elected" are myths that distort public discussions).
58 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 (holding plaintiffs requirement of showing that race
was predominant factor motivating legislature's decision must be supported by proof of
legislature's subordination of traditional race-neutral districting principles); Id. at 2500
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that state legislators recognize communities that
have particular racial makeup to account for interests shared by persons grouped to-
gether); Richard H. Pildes & Richard H. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 496 (1993) (noting compliance with section 2 of Voting Rights Act and
Gingles test requires race-conscious districting). But cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning that use of race prefer-
ences to even score reinforces manner of thinking that will lead to more injustice).
59 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding Court is
only divided by issue of how race may be considered in redistricting); see also Laughlin
McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson?, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L.
119, 145-46 (1996) (commenting on difficulty in applying Miller standard in taking race
into account in redistricting); cf. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court failed to explain what showing plaintiff must make to establish
standing to litigate).
60 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (noting mere assertion of remedial action to eradi-
cate past racial discrimination does not constitute compelling interest); Adarand Con-
structors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (noting all racial classifications im-
posed by government must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling interest); Accord
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that plaintiffs' claim was justiciable un-
der strict scrutiny review, Court reached no conclusion as to whether State's interest in
meeting requirements of Voting Rights Act constituted compelling state interest); cf. City
of Mobile Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 64 (1980) (holding that racially discriminatory mo-
tivation is necessary ingredient of Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation).
61 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493 (determining that there was no threat of retrogres-
sion in Georgia's redistricting plan and that it was Justice Department policy rather than
Voting Rights Act that required third majority-minority district).
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Act did not require Georgia's drawing of its Eleventh District to
enhance the percentage of the minority voting population. 62
Strict scrutiny review as applied in Miller may further purge
many minorities from elected office. 63
A. Race Based Redistricting as Benign Race Classification
Prior to Shaw, the Supreme Court had limited exposure to the
problem of race-based redistricting. 64 Moreover, the entire area
was not considered subject to judicial review because it was
deemed a political question.65 For example, in three cases prior
to Shaw, the court specifically failed to address whether, absent
a claim under section 5 of the Act, a state may use race to bolster
minority voting strength.66 Not surprisingly, in keeping with its
affirmative action jurisprudence, the Court has been reluctant to
apply anything less than heightened judicial scrutiny in the re-
62 Id. at 2492 (reasoning that legislative plans that increase majority-minority can-
not violate section 5 unless apportionment itself so discriminates on basis of race or color
as to violate Constitution) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)); see
also Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (reasoning that legislative reapportionment that enhances
voting position of racial minorities cannot have effect of diluting right to vote on account
of race within meaning of section 5).
63 See McDonald, supra note 59, at 162 (noting Court's equal protection decisions of
past two terms are damaging to minorities' efforts to overcome past societal discrimina-
tion).
64 See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155-162
(1977) (rejecting objections by petitioners to use of racial criteria in redistricting under
Voting Rights Act); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-63 (1971) (holding discrimi-
nation was not invidious where representatives of legislative district, known minority
ghetto, did not reside in district); Wright v. Rockfeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (accepting
lower Court's finding that challenged part of New York Act was not intended to segregate
on basis of race or place of origin); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)
(holding that Alabama legislature may not redraw district to deprive petitioners of mu-
nicipal franchise).
65 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (6th ed. 1990) (defining political question doc-
trine to be based upon premise that certain issues are subject to separation of powers,
rendering their determination outside realm of judicial resolution). But see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-210 (1962) (stating that although issue of legislative apportion-
ment appears to be political question, Supreme Court has held that challenging state ap-
portionment statute does not present nonjusticiable political question); Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (holding that federal courts may declare particular elec-
toral system invalid).
66 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346 (finding that Alabama legislature actions to segre-
gate racial minority and affect voting distribution was controversy "out of the so-called
political arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation"); United Jew-
ish Org. of Wifliamsburgh, 40 U.S. at 168 (avoiding interference with state plan that is
authorized because "it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of
any group or party, but to ... provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the
legislative halls of the State"); Wright, 376 U.S. at 69 (directing plaintiffs to attack con-
stitutionality of state statute and negate inference that racial segregation was purpose of
redistricting).
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districting context. 67
On the other hand, there is a long history of intermediate
scrutiny for benign race discrimination. 68 This has been sug-
gested by Justice Steven's dissent in Bush v. Vera,6 9 where the
Court held that a race-based district was unconstitutional. 70 Not
until Richmond v. J.A. Croson71 was there a clear majority on
the Court 72 supporting the application of strict scrutiny to race
based classifications without regard to whether a minority or
majority was burdened or benefited. 73 Prior to Richmond, the
67 See James U. Blackshear, Majority Black Districts, Kiryas Joel, and Other Chal-
lenges to American Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 407, 407 (1995-96) (theorizing that
racial criteria in redistricting will generally be subject to strict scrutiny, offering Voting
Rights Act and remedial action for racial discrimination as examples); Paul Butler et al.,
Race Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 567, 569 (1996) (hypothesizing that "judging by the Court's rhetoric," holding in
Miller suggested strict judicial scrutiny, it was merely "a natural follow-up" to Shaw);
Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or Majority? The Role of Jus-
tice O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L. REV. 47, 47 (1990) (discussing
lack of majority view as to appropriate level of review for race-based classifications); John
E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 345, 443 (1995) (theorizing that Justice Souter, given his dissenting opin-
ion in Shaw, may be inclined to vote in favor of federal racial affirmative action pro-
grams); see also Stanley Pierre-Louis, The Politics of Influence Dilution Claims Under
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1231-32 (1995) (discussing
impact of Shaw on race based redistricting, author criticizes holding as not prohibitive of
such practice); Douglas Hill Schwartz, Toward a Colorblind Society: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms its Position Against Raced-Based Redistricting, 64 U. CIN.L. REV. 1439, 1457
(1996)(discussing Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Miller which criticizes majority holding
that strict scrutiny applies whenever race is motivating factor in redistricting, further
urging that it is minority voters who require more judicial protection than others).
68 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1977 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that prior to Shaw only strict scrutiny applied where individual or set of individuals were
harmed because of their race).
69 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1977 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1959-60 (explaining that districts resulting from racial gerrymandering are
unconstitutional).
71 488 U.S. 49 (1989).
72 Id. Justices Marshall and Blackmun each filed dissenting opinions in which Jus-
tice Brennan joined. Id.
73 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (overruling
post-Croson decision in Metro Broad. v. FCC, that race based classifications may be sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny, reiterating that race based classification is subject to strictjudicial scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (noting
strict scrutiny is intended to "smoke out" illegitimate use of race by making certain legis-
lature employs means most narrowly tailored to achieve goal); see also Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians,
106 YALE L.J. 537, 567 (1996) (hypothesizing that holdings of Croson and Adarand ap-
parently apply when legislation contains classification for Native Americans); Karen M.
Berberich, Note, Strict in Theory, Not Fatal in Fact: An Analysis of Federal Action Pro-
grams in the Wake of Adarand v. Pena, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 101, 111-15
(1995) (discussing history of Supreme Court failure to decide on applicable standard for
governmental race based classification prior to application of strict scrutiny in Croson);
Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and Directions From
the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1012-14 (1996) (setting forth history of affirmative
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Court permitted racial classifications upon a showing that they
served an important governmental objective and thus satisfied
intermediate scrutiny.74 Furthermore, whenever the Court re-
viewed these classifications, it showed deference to any congres-
sional acts which utilized benign race classifications to further
the "general welfare" of the United States. 75 Similar to Rich-
mond, where a minority set-aside program adopted by a munici-
pality was struck down by the Court, congressional districting
pursuant to Congress' mandate in the Voting Rights Act was not
given any deference by the Court.76
B. Should Intermediate Scrutiny Be Applied to Benign Race-
Based Redistricting?
In Adarand Constructors v. Pena,77 a post Shaw decision, the
Court declined to utilize intermediate scrutiny to analyze con-
gressional race-based classifications. Like state race-based
classification, the Court decided that congressional race-based
classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis.78
action educational programs, author asserts that Croson and Adarand may serve to un-
dermine those higher education programs aimed at increasing minority enrollment).
74 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-75 (1986) (requiring that
affirmative action plans for public employees must be justified by past or present dis-
crimination by government agency), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (1980) (granting Congress considerable latitude in tempo-
rary use of race and ethnic criteria to accomplish remedial objectives); Brian C. Eades,
The United States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,
29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 771, 799-801 (1996) (discussing evolution of Supreme Court
treatment of race conscious government programs); David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action
and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43 n.38 (1995) (offering examples of in-
stances in which Court has allowed use of racial criteria); Bradley David Wine, Note, Can
You Get to Kings County on Interstate 95: A Reevaluation of United Jewish Organizations
v. Carey In Light of Shaw v. Reno, 19 VT. L. REV. 843, 879-80 (1995) (asserting that
Court's rejection of dissenting opinion of United Jewish Organizations that racial criteria
is impermissible, although allowing States to consider race in districting, should not be
considered endorsement of such consideration).
75 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 489.
76 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1941 (1996) (considering failure to review race
based classifications as abdication of Court's role in safeguarding mandates of Constitu-
tion); see also Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm'n., 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992)(distinguishing
between deference and acquiescence in applying administrative interpretation of Voting
Rights Act); Barrett, supra note 5, at 273 (advocating greater deference to congressional
intent in providing state remedial action for past discrimination, author urges that Court
should commit to permitting use of race in those state actions designed to comply with
section 5); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 82 n.108 (1984) (suggesting that open lines of communication
should be maintained between judiciary and legislature when questions of constitutional-
ity of congressional actions arise).
77 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
78 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (deciding that same standard of scrutiny should ap-
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Applying this standard in the congressional districting context
inevitably bars benign race-based classifications intended to
remedy prior "societal discrimination. ' 79 A strict scrutiny test,
therefore, would require that any race based remedy be for an
"identified discrimination" and that such remedial action have a
strong basis in evidence. 80 Arguably, the type of evidence re-
quired in Adarand is similar to the evidence necessary to estab-
lish a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
81 It is
submitted that a plaintiff who satisfies the requirement of a vote
dilution claim may, in effect, also pass muster under a strict
scrutiny analysis.
IV. BUSH V. VERA: AN IMPOSSIBLE STANDARD TO MEET WHILE
COMPLYING WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
In Bush v. Vera,82 the Court recognized that states have a
compelling interest when redistricting to avoid section 2 liability.
The Court, nonetheless, held that Texas' attempts at redistrict-
ing were not narrowly tailored to comply with section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. 83 In Vera,84 the Court focused primarily on
ply to Congress as applied to states via Fifth Amendment); see also Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) (discussing application of equivalent standards to state
and federal governments via Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, respectively); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (noting that restrictions placed on
States by Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause are equally applicable to federal
government by way of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (declaring it "unthinkable" that Constitution, which impresses re-
strictions on states should "impose a lesser duty on federal government").
79 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 (noting that remedial action to correct societal dis-
crimination is not appropriate compelling state interest); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (suggesting that "government
can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to
'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"); Id. at 2119 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (asserting that "governmental-
sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimi-
nation inspired by malicious prejudice").
80 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 (stating that state's interest in using racial classifica-
tion is compelling when past discrimination is identifiable and strongly evidenced); Shaw
v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1902-03 (1996) (describing circumstances under which State
attempt to remedy past use of race is permissible as when past discrimination is
"identified" and heavily based in evidence).
81 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962-63 (rejecting appellant's claim of need to remedy vote
dilution as section 5 compliance, since appellant had cited same reasons in claiming
compliance with section 2, Court did not reject notion that same reason could, in fact,
underlie both claims).
82 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
83 Id. (holding Texas districts as unconstitutional because subordination of tradi-
tional districting principles was not narrowly tailored to considerations of race). See Har-
vard Law Review Association, Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L. REV. 135, 135 (1996)
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what justification a state may present in defense of its newly-
drawn districts. 85 The Court rejected the notion that political
factors such as partisanship and incumbency were predominant
factors.86 Although appellants presented ample evidence sug-
gesting that it was involved in political gerrymandering, 87 the
Court concluded that race was the "predominant factor" in
drawing its districts. 88
The Court analyzed Texas' use of detailed racial data and
found that traditional districting principles were neglected.
89
The strong correlation of the newly drawn district layout to the
protection of incumbents as a factor was recognized by the
(discussing facts of Romer v. Evans, where Supreme Court affirmed injunction of en-
forcement of section 2 where districting was not narrowly tailored to meet recognized
compelling interests); Jennifer Denise Rogers, Miller v. Johnson:L The Supreme Court
"Remaps" Shaw v. Reno, 56 LA. L. REV. 981, 1004 (1996) (discussing Vera district court
determination that avoidance of § 5 liability, even if justifiable, was unconstitutional be-
cause not narrowly tailored).
84 Id. at 1960 (finding that since districts formed were unexplainable on grounds
other than racial considerations, strict scrutiny would be appropriate test because this
was raced based classification); see Kent D. Hollis, Strict or Benign Scrutiny Under the
Equal Protection Clause: Troublesome Areas Remain, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 93, 116 (1990)
(stating that racial classifications intended to help disadvantaged groups should merit
lower standard of constitutional review). See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
489 (1980) (granting Congress considerable latitude in temporary use of race and ethnic
criteria to accomplish remedial objectives); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 355-362 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring) (presenting notion of a lower stan-
dard for benign racial classifications).
85 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1952 (1996) (reviewing District Court's record to
determine whether incumbency protection played role in redistricting). See generally
Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 249 (noting "[t]he way in which districts are drawn often determines
which voters will be able to elect their preferred candidates and which voters will have
their preferences go unsatisfied"); cf. Amar, supra note 3, at 1290 n.47 (arguing that
"[t]he power to draw district lines is the power to decide which groups shall wield real
power in a district and which groups shall be relegated to perpetual minority status").
86 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (concluding racially motivated gerrymandering had
greater influence than politically motivated gerrymandering).
87 See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1957 (noting that evidence suggested predominance of race
and despite strong correlation between race and political affiliation, maps indicated po-
litical affiliation was subordinated to race).
88 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1957 (noting despite strong correlation between race and politi-
cal affiliation, racial criteria predominated). Id. at 1955 (noting appellants concession
that substantial disregard for traditional districting existed, but only for purpose of
uniting communities of interest in single district). But cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
646 (1993) (noting that "when members of a racial group live together in one community,
a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and ex-
cludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes."); United Jewish Orgs.,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 176 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ('It would be naive to
suppose that racial considerations do not enter into apportionment decisions.").
89 Johnson v. Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (noting in order for strict scrutiny
to apply traditional districting criteria must be subordinate to race).
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Court.90 The majority, however, deemed the lack of other non-
race data in proportion to that of race as controlling in their de-
cision. 9 1 Evidence of the correlation between political affiliation
and race was considered insufficient to overcome the use of race
in Texas' redistricting plan.92 In sum, when the majority consid-
ered the bloc-by-bloc racial data used by Texas to draft its plan,
they found it created a presumption of race-based districting
that was not rebutted by other evidence. 93 Consequently, the
Court's view of the evidence triggered the use of a strict scrutiny
standard of review for Texas' newly-drawn districts.
Since the Court concluded that race was a predominant fac-
tor,94 the Court's focus shifted to whether such a classification
was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest."95 Texas
90 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956. In some instances, incumbency protection might explain
a State's decision to depart from other traditional districting principles in the drawing of
bizarre district lines. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993)). The fact that
many of the voters being fought over by the incumbent Democrats were indeed African-
American, "would not in and of itself, convert a political gerrymander into a racial ger-
rymander, no matter how conscious redistricters were of the correlation between race
and party affiliation." Id.
91 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1955. The evidence existed that the state had complied detailed
racial data for use in redistricting. Id. The appellants presented a substantial case that
incumbency protection rivaled race in determining the district's shape. Id. District 30
was designed in part to create a safe Democratic seat for Representative Johnson. Id.
Traditional districting principles were followed without much conscious thought, they
cannot be said to have been 'subordinated to race.' Id. In considering whether race was
the 'predominant factor motivating the legislature,' it is however, evidentially significant
that at the time of the redistricting, the State had compiled detailed racial data for use in
redistricting, but made no apparent attempt to compile, and did not refer specifically to,
equivalent data regarding communities of interest." Id.
92 Id. at 1956 (arguing although incumbency protection may explain departure from
traditional redistricting, but Texas districts used race as proxy for political characteris-
tics). But cf. id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting statistical affiliation correlation
between blacks and their political affiliation); id. at 2001 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(recognizing role racial groups play in political decision making); id. (quoting Miller, 115
S. Ct. at 2497) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (noting that "race-conscious redistricting does
not always violate the Constitution").
93 Id. at 1957 (noting "districting software used by state provided racial data at the
block-by-block level").
94 Id. at 1958 ("District 30's combination of bizarre, non-compact shape and over-
whelming evidence that shape was essentially dictated by racial considerations of one
form or another is exceptional .... ).
95 Id. at 1960 (concluding that since strict scrutiny applies, Court must determine
whether three districts drawn were "narrowly tailored to further a compelling state in-
terest"). See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963 (holding that two requisite conditions must be sat-
isfied for State's interest in remedying past discrimination to be compelling: specific
identified discrimination and strong basis in evidence necessitating remedial action); id.
(quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657) (stating that "the only current problem that appellants
cite as in need of remediation is alleged vote dilution as a consequence of racial bloc vot-
ing, the same concern that underlies their VRA section 2 compliance defense, which we
have assumed to be valid. .. We have indicated that such problems will not justify race-
based districting unless 'the State employ[s] sound districting principles, and.., the af-
[Vol. 12:756
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presented evidence to suggest its motives in redistricting in-
cluded avoiding liability under the "result test" of section 2 of the
Act,96 remedying past and present discrimination, and satisfying
the "nonretrogression" principle of section 5 of the Act.
97
A. Compliance With Section Two Compelling But Unnecessary
While the Court in Vera recognized that compliance with sec-
tion 2 of the Act may be a compelling interest, 98 the Court was
not convinced that Texas' redistricting plan was necessary to
comply with the "result test."99 Although mindful of the state's
sovereign interest in redistricting, 10 0 the Court suggested Texas'
fected racial group's residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in
which they will be in the majority."').
96 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1996). A violation exists
under § 2(b)'s "results test" when, "based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice." Id.; see also Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960 (discussing that under
results test for determining VRA violations "[a] § 2 district that is reasonably compact
and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining
communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without
having to defeat rival compact districts designed by plaintiffs' experts in endless 'beauty
contests."'); id. at 1961 (quoting Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488) (reaffirming that "[i]t is well-
settled that reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the States [and
not the federal courts]."); but cf. id. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the
combined plurality, minority, and Court opinions do not ultimately leave the law dealing
with a Shaw claim appreciably clearer or more manageable than Shaw itself did...
[T]he price of Shaw I, indeed, may turn out to be the practical elimination of a State's
discretion to apply traditional districting principles .... ").
97 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1996) (prohibiting State or
political subdivision subject to Section Four of Act from enforcing any voting practice
that will result in denying or abridging minority's right to vote); see also Vera, 116 S. Ct.
at 1958 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1994)) (finding
there to be unconstitutional gerrymander due to bizzarely drawn districts as well as dis-
regard for traditional redistricting guidelines).
98 See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1993) (supporting premise that mul-
timember and at-large districting plans pose threat to minority voter participation) ;
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1975) (setting out factors for
consideration in determining constitutionality of at-large and multimember districting
plans); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (1996) (stating assumption that
"compliance with section 2 could be a compelling interest").
99 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961 (finding that state "lacks a strong basis in evidence"
and that bizarre shape of district, and lack of compactness were predominantly due to
race).
100 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (recognizing state apportion-
ment as domain of states unless there exists violation of federal law); Vera, 116 S. Ct. at
1964 (noting dissent's concern as to courts involvement in districting process); Chapman
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (confirming that reapportionment is primarily duty and
responsibility of State through its legislature or other body, rather than of federal court);
1997]
776 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:756
plan was not in compliance with the "result test." Thus, it ap-
pears that the Court suggested that an acceptable plan to rem-
edy or avoid liability under section 2 is one that would be aware
of race, but does not use race as a predominant factor.10 1 Seem-
ingly, states may continue to redress section 2 violations by
walking the tightrope created by the Rehnquist Court.
B. Compliance With Section Five as a Compelling Interest
Similarly, the Court declined to recognize Texas' compliance
with section 5 of the Act as being reasonably necessary to further
a compelling state interest and thus it did not meet the strict
scrutiny standard. 102 Speaking for the majority, Justice
O'Connor suggested that a proper reading of the statute, and
particularly a reading of its non-retrogression principle, did not
require Texas to increase the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts. 103 The only acceptable plan, therefore, would be one
drafted to preserve the position of minorities with respect to
their right to vote. 104 Unfortunately, this Court is at odds with
the Justice Department's reading of section 5, which deemed
section 5 to require the maximization of majority-minority dis-
tricts. 105 In the view of the Court, however, Texas went well be-
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (recognizing that judiciary should institute
interim reapportionment plans only when legislature fails to reapportion according to
federal constitutional requisites); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S., 656, 676 (1964)
(recognizing primary responsibility for representative apportionment as falling on legis-
lature).
101 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961.
102 Id. at 1963 (recognizing no basis in state argument that increase in African-
American population of one district was "necessary to insure nonretrogression."); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993) (concluding reapportionment plans would not be consid-
ered narrowly tailored to avoid retrogression if State surpassed actions "reasonably nec-
essary" in engaging in such avoidance); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 565 (1969) (noting section 5 applies to subtle as well as obvious state regulations).
See generally Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and
Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 318-20 (1995) (discussing general application and proce-
dural requirements of § 5 of Voting Rights Act).
103 Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1949.
104 See id. at 1963 (recognizing that nonretrogression does not serve as authorization
for State to insure continued electoral success, but requires State to act in manner to
safeguard minority right to elect representatives of choice); see also Beer v. U.S., 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (noting section 5 of Act does not permit implementation of reappor-
tionment leading to retrogression in regards to exercise of right to vote); Scott Gluck,
Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 337, 342 (1996) (stating section 5 of Act covers
"changes in electoral laws aimed at vote dilution").
105 Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1950 (stating that intentional creation of majority-minority
districts is subject to scrutiny); see also Heather K. Way, A Shield or a Sword? Section
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yond what was necessary to comply with the mandates of section
5.106
C. Vera: Creating an Impossible Standard for States to Achieve
Although recent decisions have severely limited the sover-
eignty of states in the area of districting, states should continue
to pursue the goals of the Act. 107 Moreover, the plurality in Vera
expressly permitted the use of race as a factor in redistricting.
10 8
It seems, however, that the Supreme Court will no longer toler-
ate flagrant use of race as a predominant factor in legislation. 10 9
The Court's incorporation of an equal protection analysis into
voting cases will severely limit the ability of states to draw ma-
jority-minority districts and simultaneously comply with the
Act. 110
Five of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument for the Importance of Section Two, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1439, 1449 (1996) (noting Justice Department can force jurisdictions that
redistrict to adopt majority-minority district).
106 Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963.
107 Id. at 1964 (recognizing that there are no "bright line" rules for such districting
issues, Court suggested that its recent line of cases may act as gauge for states to act in
compliance with Voting Rights Act); Scott E. Blissman, Navigating the Political Thicket:
The Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, and the "Predominant Motive" in District
Apportionment Cases After Miller v. Johnson, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 503, 538 (1996)
(commenting Supreme Court failed to create bright line rules as to what extent legisla-
ture can consider race in apportionment process); cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerry-
mandering in a Complex World: A Reply to Judge Sentelle, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1257,
1265-66 (1996) (criticizing judicial "ongoing and indecisive entry into the tangled world of
redistricting").
108 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (noting classification based on race is not always
subject to strict scrutiny merely because race is factor); Robert Marguard, High Court
May Draw Line on Racial Districts by Taking Up This Voting Rights Case: The Supreme
Court Shows Willingness to Hear, Not Duck, the Hard Issues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 9, 1996 (discussing Vera decision that race could not be "predominant, overriding"
factor in creating districts); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Out of Order, POL'Y REV., Sept.
19, 1996 at 14 (discussing Justice's passionate disagreement over congressional redis-
tricting issue).
109 See Annette Fuentes, Behind the Lines: The Conservative Stealth Attack on Ra-
cial Redistricting, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 22, 1996 at 28 (discussing current Court's will-
ingness to discard majority-minority districts and that has opened floodgates to these
types of suits); see also Michael J. Moffat, The Death of the Voting Rights Act or an Exer-
cise in Geometry - Shaw v. Reno Provides More Questions than Answers, 22 PEPP. L. REV.
727, 778 (1995) (stating flagrant use of race will not be tolerated); Chi Chi Sileo, Courting
Change: Thomas Leads Charge on Race, Federalism, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Sept. 4, 1995 at 8
(noting impact of Miller on Voting Rights Act and conflicts which will arise).
110 See Goforth, supra note 15, at 55 (noting that practically speaking, courts lacked
ability to remedy systematic discrimination); see also Aaron Epstein, Supreme Court Re-
jects Racially Drawn Districts, THE RECORD, June 14 1996, at Al (describing Supreme
Court as "torn" between Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection clause when decid-
ing validity of Majority-minority districts). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Raising Poli-
tics Up: Minority Political Participation and Section of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 449, 520 (1994) (describing safe districts as approach that most courts currently
778 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:756
The constitutionality of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has
never been directly challenged. Consequently, states are subject
to section 2 liability. 111 As a result, states may be hard-pressed
to comply with section 2 of the Act while simultaneously avoid-
ing suit for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under the
Court's "representational harms" cause of action. 112 It is likely
that the Court will continue to view compliance with section 2 as
a compelling state interest. 113 Assuming this is the case, states
may be inclined to create majority-minority districts to avoid i-
ability. 114 States, however, should be cautious of the Court's im-
possible standard, which requires that so long as traditional dis-
tricting criteria are not subordinated to race, strong evidence
that the Gingles factors are present, and a district is drawn to
address these factors, any newly-drawn district would be deemed
presumptively constitutional. 115 Conversely, where the district
lines are bizarrely drawn, and the district is not compact, and
traditional districting criteria are neglected, the district would
be unconstitutional. 116 Districts drawn with the intention of in-
favor and identifying process as within category of race conscious remedies that framers
of Voting Rights Act explicitly anticipated).
111 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (holding section 2 of
Voting Rights Act was valid exercise of power under Fifteenth Amendment); see also
White v. Alabama, 867 F. Supp. 1519, 1549 (M.D. Ala. 1994), vacated 74 F.3d 1058
(1996), on remand 922 F. Supp. 522 (1996) (noting result test has not been held unconsti-
tutional); Bonnie L. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 730 (1996) (noting Court hinted
that Congress did not intend require race-based districting with section 2 of VRA, to do
so would be unconstitutional).
112 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (noting States would be
irresponsible in disregarding liabilities of section 2 "results test"); see also J. Morgan
Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and Representation, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 625, 655 (1995) (asserting O'Connor's analysis froze white supremacy and
black exclusion in place even if districts patently violated both section 2 and Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments).
113 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969; see also McKaskle, supra note 20, at 52 (suggesting
compliance with section 2 is arguably compelling state interest).
114 See David M. Guinn & Paul C. Sewall, Miller v. Johnson: Redistricting and the
Elusive Search for a Safe Harbor, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 895, 906-907 (1995) (discussing
what strict scrutiny test may require from states).
115 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (suggesting that where these factors are not met dis-
tricting should be presumptively unconstitutional); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-43
(noting racially aligned redistricting was not impermissible per se); see also Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (discussing "disproportionate impact does not turn
the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of equal protection clause").
116 See, e.g., DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (stating
"Shaw applies to redistricting plans that on their face are so dramatically irregular that
they can only be explained as attempts to segregate by the races for purpose of voting
without regard for traditional redistricting principles"); George L. Waas, The Process and
Politics of Legislative Reapportionment and Redistricting Under the Florida Constitution,
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creasing minority representation will be vulnerable to equal pro-
tection challenges and consequently may result in the loss of mi-
nority members of Congress. 117
D. Compliance With Section Five as Compelling State Interest
Given that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires all
"covered states" to obtain preclearance by the Attorney General
or approval by a United States District Court, 118 the preclear-
ance requirement is considered applicable to congressional redis-
tricting plans. 119 In particular, section 5's "non-retrogression"
principle prevents states from instituting any voting procedures
which would diminish a voting minority's exercise of the elec-
toral franchise. 120 The Court thus concedes that covered states
have a compelling state interest in complying with section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. 121 Nevertheless, states must be certain
that their redistricting plans are narrowly tailored to comply
18 NOVA. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1994) (noting "there is no point at which population devia-
tion becomes de minimis or insignificant for congressional reapportionment").
117 See Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 185-86 (1996) (noting Shaw unjusti-
fiably prevents good faith effort to America's history of discrimination in voting); see also
Carol M. Swain, Limiting Racial Gerrymandering- The Future of Black Representation
Current, WEST LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1996 at 3, available in 1996 WL 9829876
(commenting on probable loss of or difficulty in keeping black representation due to re-
cent decisions). See generally Waas, supra note 116 at 1008-09 (stating Equal Protection
Clause applies to state legislative realignment).
118 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(1972). See Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 161 (1980) (holding that "Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires pre-
clearance for all covered districts"); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (1996) (noting
preclearance requirement has substantive goal to insure that no voting procedure
changes would be made that would lead to retrogression in position of racial minorities
with respect to their right to vote); see also Loren Singer, Fee Charged to Convention
Delegates Required Preclearance, Supreme Court Decides, WEST LEGAL NEWS, March 3,
1996 at 2713 (stating requirement of preclearance by U.S. Attorney General under sec-
tion 5 regarding any change in voting practice or procedure).
119 See Beer v. U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976) (requiring that voting changes "not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color"); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct 2475, 2483 (noting pre-
clearance mechanism applies to congressional redistricting plans and requires changes
not have purpose of denying right to vote on account of race or color). See generally
George W. Jordan, Navigating the Constitutional Minefield of Race-Conscious Redistrict-
ing, 2 TEX. F. C.L. & C.R. 81, 81 (1996) (discussing preclearance requirements).
120 See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483. See generally BERNARD
GROFMAN, VOTING RIGHTS, VOTING WRONGS: THE LEGACY OF BAKER V. CARR 11 (1990)
(noting prohibiting power of section 5 requirements to end discriminatory use of at-large
elections).
121 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963 (holding although Texas had compelling interest, it
went beyond what was necessary to avoid retrogression); see also Rogers, supra note 83,
at 995 (discussing when court will ever determine whether compliance with section 5
preclearance is equivalent to compelling interest); Jordan, supra note 119, at 81 (noting
compliance with section 5 "may constitute compelling interest").
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with section 5.122 For example, even when states are complying
directly with the orders of the Justice Department, their plans
may still not survive strict scrutiny.123 Apparently, the Court
has deemed it unnecessary in the redistricting context to grant
the Executive Branch any deference in the latter's interpretation
of the Act. 124
It seems the Court will permit neither Congress nor the states
to overreach the mandates of section 5, even if such overreaching
will serve to remedy past societal discrimination. 125 Conse-
quently, redistricting plans that attempt to increase the number
of majority-minority districts will, in all likelihood, be considered
in violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 126 Since section
5's remedial purpose is limited, the Court's interpretation of its
purpose will not permit states, which are increasing their major-
ity-minority districts, to argue that such compliance with section
5 constitutes a compelling state interest. 127 The majority, ar-
guably, has foreclosed the possibility of using past racial dis-
crimination in any way to justify the use of the Act to improve
122 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2493 (1995) (noting that section 5 has limited sub-
stantive goal); see also Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1037, 1060 (1996) (noting court did not unequivocally state that compliance with
Miller, standing alone, would automatically satisfy strict scrutiny test).
123 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (noting all racial classifications reviewed under strict scrutiny);
Lydia M. Nicosia, A State Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment When it Uses Race as a Predominant Factor in Drawing Congressional Districts, 25
STETSON L. REV. 925, 925-26 (1996) (discussing strict scrutiny as applied in Miller v.
Johnson).
124 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (refusing to allow executive branch to share in ju-
dicial powers); see also Bernard Schwartz, "Administrative Law Cases During 1995", 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 399, 415-16 (1996) (noting Miller confirmed that voting rights under
equal protection analysis is for judiciary, not executive to decide).
125 See Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 670 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (describing conflict
between holding in Shaw and need for classification based on race to remedy VRA viola-
tions to be "catch-22" situation). See generally Laughlin McDonald, Can Minority Voting
Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson?, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 123-26 (1996) (describing
Georgia's difficulty in arriving at valid redistricting plan).
126 See Beer v. U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (holding "ameliorative plans" cannot
violate section 5 unless apportionment plan discriminates on basis of race or color). See,
e.g., Dewitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413-14 (E.D. Cal 1994) (redistricting plan in
California upheld even though race was factor because it was used in permissible bal-
ance of traditional redistricting principles and VRA).
127 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1898 (1996)
(rejecting state's interest in complying with section 5 of VRA as valid justification for
classification based on race). But see Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After
Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 58-59 (1995) (noting that Court left door
open by allowing states to prove existence of compelling interest to justify classification
based on race).
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minority voting rights. 128
CONCLUSION
While the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been called the most
important civil rights legislation of this century, it is clearly a
law under siege. Although the Supreme Court has found the
mandates of sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act constitu-
tional, the remedial relief available under the Act has been se-
verely limited by recent decisions. It appears that the Court's
foray into the political thicket may be an attempt by the majority
to stamp its own vision of a color-blind society.
Unfortunately, some states are now left in the precarious po-
sition of attempting to address their ignominious past according
to the federal guidelines while exposing themselves to potential
liability under the Supreme Court's paternalistic gaze. Though
well intended, the Court's vision is not a true reflection of Amer-
ica's racial realities, past or present.
Gary Day
128 See Rogers, supra note 83, at 987 (noting that 1982 amendments and Thornburg
do not suggest that VRA ensures members of any class proportional representation).
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